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Problems of Distance, Communications, and Authority:
How Charles V and Philip II Ruled the Global Spanish Empire

Cody Bryan Mitchell
The University of New England
(Armidale, Australia)

In any period, reliable and up-to-date sources of accurate information are vital to
the function of a government, and, inevitably, the possession of superior intelligence
provides an important strategic advantage. This factor was no less important during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With reference to the issue of communications,
this essay seeks to explain how the Spanish (or Castilian) crown during this time
managed its worldwide empire. It emphasizes the contribution of, and the tension
between, the crown’s two main strategies, namely, political decentralization (or
delegation) and imperial centralization. Drawing on the comments of both
contemporary observers and modern historians, this paper examines the approaches
used by the Spanish kings in ensuring the optimum reliability of their intelligence
networks within Europe and with America. Ultimately, these monarchs utilized
centralized authority and decentralized administration in a complementary fashion to
ensure that their provinces around the world were governed efficiently.
For the Spanish monarchs and their governments during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the problem of distance was inextricably linked to that of reliable
communications. In his book, Command in War, Creveld contends that “war
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consists…of an endless quest for certainty” and that two factors generate certainty—one
of which is “the amount of information available” and the other of which is the “nature”
of the undertaking at hand. 1 For the Habsburg rulers of Spain in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, this search for certainty was no less important. 2 In 1559,
Venetian Ambassador Michele Suriano wrote that, in governance, “nothing is more
helpful and necessary than accurate information.” 3 Early modern governments used
various methods of communications; however, nothing could replace having the
monarch present to rule a jurisdiction in person. To quote Guilmartin, “a competent and
responsible commander on the scene” cannot be replaced by any “amount of
communications.” 4 Lovett notes that the presence of the monarch in one of his
districts—allowing him to communicate directly with his subjects—was inevitably the
most effective and popular form of government during this period. 5 Nonetheless, this
method was seldom realistic—even during the more “migratory” reign of Charles V
(1519-1556)—so the Spanish kings resorted to other means. 6
More significant than the speed of the communications was the level of
consistency involved. 7 The delivery of information during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries was notoriously unreliable. Within Europe, a regular postal
service operated, but the journey between Brussels and Madrid typically took around
two weeks. 8 Philip II (1556–1598) himself blamed many of his governmental issues on
the “distance” between his many kingdoms – and, thus, the unpredictability of the

Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1985),
164-165.
2
Henry Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power (London: Penguin, 2003), 158.
3
Michele Suriano, “The strongest and safest Christian land”, in Pursuit of Power, ed. James C. Davis
(New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), 35.
4
Quoted in Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1998), 74.
5
A.W. Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 1517-1598 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 123-124.
6
Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 126.
7
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 52-55.
8
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 158.
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correspondence between them. 9 In one case, Philip sent a dispatch ordering his
commanders in the Netherlands to seek a military settlement with the Dutch rebels.
Unfortunately for him, the courier was delayed, and, by the time the dispatch arrived,
the commands were no longer relevant to the situation. 10 More significant for the
Spanish monarchs, was the problem of governing their American colonies. 11 Lovett
sees the issues associated with distance and governance as “magnified” in relation to the
administration of the Indies. 12 In fact, a special committee tasked with examining
American colonial issues counted the lack of information—a direct result of the Indies”
distance from Spain—as among the main causes of maladministration on the
continent. 13 The rarity of reliable, consistent, and up-to-date information caused an
added level of complexity in the governing of the Spanish empire in Europe and abroad.
Spanish kings used many strategies to minimize the unreliability and
inconsistency of communications during their reign. This factor was more important for
Philip II as he spent very little time outside of Spain and, consequently, needed a
reliable means of information gathering. Across the empire, Philip II created a massive
web of communications to ensure the reliability and consistency, if not the speed, of the
intelligence he received. Already in place was a bi-monthly postal service between
Madrid and Brussels; similar services also ran from Madrid to Rome and Vienna
respectively. 14 When necessary, special messengers could be sent with particularly
important messages. 15 Parker points out the numerous other tactics that the Spanish
kings used to improve the reliability of their courier services. Typically, they would
Quoted in Parker, The Grand Strategy, 48.
A.W. Lovett, Philip II and Mateo Vázquez de Leca: The Government of Spain (1572-1592) (Geneva:
Librairie Droz, 1977), 140-141.
11
C.H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Harbinger Books, 1963), 76.
12
Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 148.
13
Cited in Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 22.
14
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 48.
15
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 49; M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire: Charles V,
Philip II and Habsburg Authority, 1551-1559 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 93.
9
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send more than one messenger with critical dispatches to ensure they reached their
destination; however, they would also often send multiple copies along with historical
messages for reference. 16 The monarchs also commonly sent vital dispatches along
multiple delivery routes and ordered that copies be forwarded on to further
destinations. 17 In this way, they could ensure that their recipient had the greatest chance
of obtaining accurate orders or correspondence.
Philip also expected his ministers, viceroys, and commanders to supply him with
consistent updates and to correspond regularly with their colleagues. 18 Ambassador
Suriano noted that kings and governments used “various channels” to gain reliable and
consistent information. 19 He then added, somewhat opportunistically perhaps, that no
such channel of information was “better than ambassadors.” 20 Philip II, in particular,
utilized both couriers and resident ambassadors to great effect. 21 Parker observes that,
under Philip, Spain had the “largest diplomatic establishment of any state” and Philip
demanded that he be consistently informed by all of his ambassadors. 22 Ambassador
Lippoman of Venetia noticed the significant quantity of correspondence from
ambassadors and deputies that Philip II had to personally deal with, stating that he “…is
never idle, for [he] wish[es] to read for himself all the correspondence which passes
between his ambassadors and governors in all parts of his great domains.” 23 Using
numerous simple means, Philip II and the other kings of Spain were able to greatly
increase the consistency and reliability of the intelligence available to them.

Parker, The Grand Strategy, 55.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 55.
18
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 56.
19
Suriano, “The strongest and safest,” 36.
20
Suriano, “The strongest and safest,” 36.
21
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 47.
22
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 56.
23
Paolo Tiepolo, Giovanni Soranzo and Girolamo Lippomano, “Philip II: “phlegmatic,” “assiduous,”
“kindly and natural””, in Pursuit of Power, ed. James C. Davis (New York, Evanston and London: Harper
& Row, 1970), 86.
16
17
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Other factors also supplemented the information network of couriers and
ambassadors. Firstly, the crown was kept well-informed—sometimes voluntarily, and
sometimes otherwise – by the efficient private communications networks, such as those
run by merchants. 24 Parker notes that these private systems often operated more
efficiently than even the public intelligence network. 25 Further, Philip II made a
concerted effort to gain as much information about his empire as he could, allowing him
to make more educated policy decisions for lands he may never have visited. 26 The
ways he did this varied dramatically. Haring points out that he tried to learn from the
experience of former governors. 27 Philip also commissioned special juntas to manage
the affairs of foreign imperial jurisdictions and investigate the best decisions for their
administration. 28 Kamen argues that without this information, it would not have been
possible to run the vast Spanish empire. 29 These factors effectively enhanced the royal
communications system.
Inevitably, the problem of communications with the Americas—and,
consequently, the tactics used to solve it—was similar to that in the rest of the Spanish
empire, although amplified greatly. A typical journey to or from the New World took
anywhere from four to nine months. 30 Government correspondence followed the
pattern of the annual trade voyages; however, the Spanish crown did its best to ensure
the reliability—if not the speed – of those convoys. 31 The need to secure these sea

Parker, The Grand Strategy, 57-58.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 55.
26
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 96; Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 160-161; Parker, The Grand
Strategy, 59-63; Patrick Williams, Philip II (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 46.
27
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 12-13.
28
Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 22 and 52-53.
29
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 256.
30
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 50.
31
David C. Goodman, Power and Penury: Government, Technology and Science in Philip II”s Spain
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 89; Parker, The Grand Strategy, 50.
24
25
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routes and ensure adequate training for pilots was generally recognized at the time. 32
For urgent news, special “advice ships” could be employed to make the trip at any
time. 33 Lovett could accurately say, then, that a “steady stream” of information and
news flowed from Mexico and Peru to the Old World. 34 Hence, by the time of Philip II,
the Spanish monarchs had access to better and more up-to-date intelligence than their
European rivals. 35 In one instance, well before his own government informed him of it,
the French Ambassador received news from Philip of his government’s victory over the
protestant forces. 36 Therefore, while speed would always remain an issue, the Spanish
kings found many ways to improve the secure flow of reliable information from the
Americas as well as within Europe.
The kings of Spain typically ruled by delegation, whatever form it may have
taken, rather than by replacing the institutions of the kingdoms they ruled or governing
them from Spain. 37 This need was inevitable, as day-to-day government from a
distance was impossible; however, the degrees of delegation and the methods used
varied. For example, Philip II tended to be less involved in running separate
jurisdictions within his empire and more focused on the empire itself. 38 Hence, he
relied more on loyal, capable viceroys to administrate for him. 39 In contrast, Philip’s
father, Charles V, was known to exercise his power more in person, traveling his empire
to maintain his authority. 40 Nevertheless, both monarchs necessarily delegated—
differing only in technique and degree. For Charles, the regency of states within the

P.E.H. Hair (ed.), To Defend Your Empire and the Faith (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1990),
30-31, 166-167, 170-171 and 204.
33
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 50.
34
Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 148.
35
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 49.
36
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 49.
37
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 3-4; H.G. Koenigsberger, The Practice of Empire (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1969), 82-83.
38
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 161-162.
39
Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 95-96; Williams, Philip II, 8-9.
40
Williams, Philip II, 8-9.
32
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empire was more customarily given to Habsburg relatives. For instance, Marguerite of
Austria, Mary of Hungary, and Margaret of Parma, in turn, were made regents of the
Netherlands, while Charles’s younger brother, Ferdinand, was given Austria and the
Holy Roman Empire. 41 Philip, on the other hand, tended to give regency over provinces
within the empire to loyal Spanish (or, more correctly, Castilian) nobles. 42
Even in Philip’s time, however, it was sometimes prudent to have a royal
presence in more important—or unstable—parts of the empire. Consequently, in the
reigns of both Charles V and Philip II, jurisdictions like Portugal and the Netherlands
typically demanded a member of the royal family to be their regent. 43 RodríguezSalgado has outlined several of the functions expected of the king’s representative.
These included the need to represent the king and to execute his commands as well as to
provide for the more general needs of the district by ensuring defense and effective
government. 44 Regents could be quite independent; in fact, Rodríguez-Salgado notes
many conflicts over finance and other issues between the sovereign and their regents. 45
Nevertheless, while a significant level of delegation was a necessary element of the
Spanish government during this period, it was certainly more effective to have the
monarch dwelling in person in any particular province. 46
All realms of the empire, whether in the Iberian peninsula or abroad, had some
form of delegated administration. Within Spain, the kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre
were run as viceroyalties—a model for the American colonial governments—and
Catalonia was administrated by a governor or, in times of war, a captain-general. 47 In
Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 40 and 55; William H. Prescott, History of the Reign of Philip the
Second, King of Spain, New Rev. Ed. (London: George Routledge, 1887), 153-154.
42
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 647; Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 87.
43
Jean Bérenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1273-1700 (London and New York: Longman,
1994), 219-220; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 146 and 176.
44
Rodríguez-Salgado, Changing Face of Empire, 20-21.
45
Rodríguez-Salgado, Changing Face of Empire, 22-23, 212, 278-296.
46
Rodríguez-Salgado, Changing Face of Empire, 23.
47
Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 141; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 214; Williams, Philip II, 92.
41
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wider Europe, jurisdictions like Portugal and the Netherlands were also ruled by
regents, and the Italian states, while accepting the sovereignty of the king and under the
authority of a viceroy, maintained their own laws, customs, and localized
governments. 48 Overseas, the government of the Spanish colony of Manila, although
under the authority of the viceroyalty of New Spain, was managed relatively
independently. 49 Likewise, the Spanish crown almost totally delegated the management
of the Portuguese empire. 50 The kings of Spain used many different forms of delegated
government in their realms.
The delegated Spanish government of the Americas took two forms: centralized,
peninsula-based administration and decentralized, colonial government. The situation
in America is broadly representative of the style of the imperial Spanish administration,
although, due to its distance from Spain, it is the most extreme example. Firstly,
Spanish kings gave much responsibility for the administration and logistical questions
of the Indies to a special council, based in Spain, called the Royal and Supreme Council
of the Indies. 51 Williams calls councils like this the “central apparatus of the state.” 52
In the earliest days of the colony, the Spanish government had established the House of
Trade, a regulatory body, based in Seville, tasked with protecting the Spanish monopoly
on trade with America, regulating traffic, monitoring the colonies, and other similar
responsibilities. 53 As the colonies grew, however, another administrative body was

Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 174; Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 83, 95-96 and 105-106;
Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 146 and 176.
49
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 202-203.
50
Hair, To Defend Your Empire, 2; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 176-177.
51
M.N. Pearson, “Merchants and states,” in The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, ed. James D.
Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 81; Prescott, History of the Reign, 647; J. Vicens
Vives, “The administrative structure of the State in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries”, in
Government in Reformation Europe, 1520-1560, ed. Henry J. Cohn (London and Basingstoke:
MacMillan, 1971), 75; Williams, Philip II, 67.
52
Williams, Philip II, 67.
53
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 288-289; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 83; Williams, Philip II, 8687.
48
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deemed necessary, and in 1524 Philip II established the Council of the Indies. 54 The
Council of Aragon, established thirty years earlier, was used as a model for the Council
of the Indies and many subsequent councils, including the councils of Italy (c. 1559),
Portugal (1582), and Flanders (1588). 55 Similar to other imperial councils, the Council
of the Indies’ influence was over all political aspects of the Americas and all colonial
government officials were appointed by and responsible to it. 56 It formed, in Lovett”s
words, a “basic structure of government” and acted as a supreme court (as Haring states,
a “court of last resort”) for the colonies. 57 The Council of the Indies was not, however,
the king’s only peninsula-based form of government. Juntas, and other types of
informal and formal investigations, became popular ways to delegate investigative work
regarding particular colonial issues. 58 These became a common mode of receiving
independent policy recommendations. 59 One junta even recommended that to reduce
costs and increase efficiency, the Council of the Indies be moved to the colony itself. 60
Thus, not all delegated authority for the Indies was based in the colonies. The House of
Trade, and later the Council of the Indies, acted as an advisory and logistical body to
oversee the colonies from within Spain.
Delegated administration also came in its overseas form with viceroys,
governors, and captains-general sharing power with audiencias on the American
continent. 61 From early in the colony’s history, the Spanish monarchs recognized the
need to have administrative institutions based in America. Hence, the first audiencia

J.H. Elliot, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1963), 171-172; Haring, The
Spanish Empire, 94-95; J.H. Parry, The Audiencia of New Galicia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of
Spanish Colonial Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 4.
55
Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 60; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 122.
56
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 97-98; Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 61-62.
57
Elliot, Imperial Spain, 171-172; Haring, The Spanish Empire, 98; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 84.
58
Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 64-65; Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 22.
59
Williams, Philip II, 87-88.
60
Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 22.
61
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 70.
54
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was established and the first viceroy appointed. 62 Due to America’s distance from
Spain, viceroys were invariably given what historians have variously called a
“voluminous” and “elaborate” set of instructions from the Council of the Indies by
which they were to run the colony. 63 The Castilian possessions in America were
divided into the two viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain, controlled by two viceroys
who also served as the governor of their district of residence. 64 Each viceroyalty was
further divided into multiple jurisdictions, known as presidencies or captaincy-generals
depending on their particular style of government. 65 Generally, the president of the
region’s audiencia was also appointed the governor of that area. 66 The power of the
viceroys was, to quote Haring, “comprehensive,” although the sovereigns
understandably appreciated “regular correspondence.” 67 Of course, to be able to handle
the mammoth task of governing either Peru or New Spain, they needed to be capable
administrators. 68 The audiencias of the New World, unlike those in the Old, had
legislative and administrative powers as well as judicial authority. 69 They shared power
with the viceroys and played an important role in the “routine administration” of the
colonies. 70 These two institutions—the viceregal system and the audiencia – worked,
for the most part, as an effective localized delegation of the everyday administration of
the American colonies. In this way, through executive delegation to local authorities
and bureaucratic councils, Philip II, Charles V, and the other Spanish monarchs could
manage the administration of their global empire without fast means of communication.

Haring, The Spanish Empire, 72.
Goodman, Power and Penury, 174; Haring, The Spanish Empire, 73; Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire,
193.
64
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 71.
65
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 71.
66
Parry, Audiencia of New Galicia, 131-132.
67
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 11 and 110-112.
68
Williams, Philip II, 927.
69
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 15 and 77; Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 22 and 144-145; Parry, Audiencia
of New Galicia, 5-6.
70
Elliot, Imperial Spain, 171-172; Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 71 and 112.
62
63
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To ensure that delegation did not divide their empire, the Spanish kings needed
to maintain the central importance of royal authority. For both Charles V and Philip II,
royal authority and, thus, the empire’s unity, was tied to the character of the sovereign,
but this was more obviously the case for Charles as Philip later began a program of
reform—transforming the empire from an entirely Habsburg-centric realm to an
increasingly Spanish one. 71 He did this in two main ways. Firstly, Philip increasingly
promoted trusted Castilians, rather than his Habsburg relatives, to positions of power. 72
In this way, he subverted the danger of rival family members bringing disunity to his
empire. Ambassador Suriano noted this development in Italy, stating that “the benefits
and honors of the kingdom…are generally given to the Spaniards….” 73 Secondly,
Philip also centered the empire in Spain, making Madrid his capital in 1561. 74 Williams
argues that Philip sought to make Spain, or perhaps, more correctly, Castile, “the heart
of his empire.” 75 From this basis, Philip set out to ensure that absolute, unchallenged
imperial authority was sustained throughout his empire. 76 He ensured that the central
government—and, ultimately, himself—was solely responsible for policy-making. 77 As
his father had done, he favored a small, centralized bureaucracy for this purpose. 78 The
king also prioritized a reestablishment in many of his jurisdictions of the ultimate
supremacy of the crown over all matters. 79

Rodríguez-Salgado, Changing Face of Empire, 20-21 and 221; Williams, Philip II, 8.
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 161; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 126-127 and 192-195; Prescott,
History of the Reign, 646; Williams, Philip II, 33.
73
Suriano, “The strongest and safest,” 47.
74
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 161; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 125-126, 128 and 155-156;
Williams, Philip II, 54-55.
75
Williams, Philip II, 46.
76
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 69; Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 192-193.
77
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 3; Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, xxiv and 161-162; Williams, Philip
II, 64.
78
Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 122-123; Parry, Audiencia of New Galicia, 133.
79
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 195 and 255; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 147; Rodríguez-Salgado,
Changing Face of Empire, 22; Williams, Philip II, 86-87, 167 and 236.
71
72

Published by Digital Commons@Georgia Southern, 2022

11

Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 1

To conclude, there was no single strategy for solving the administrative
problems presented by a lack of fast communications methods. Rather, the Castilian
crown used various strategies to sure up their intelligence arrangements and to
adequately govern their jurisdictions throughout the world. This essay has outlined
some of the approaches pursued by the Spanish monarchs in this regard. It briefly
touched on the myriad of techniques used to improve the reliability, although not
primarily the speed, of their communications networks. This provided them with the
ability to receive a stable flow of information to assist in governing their realms. In
fact, the Spanish monarchs succeeded in this effort to the point that their information
was often more reliable, and sometimes even more readily available, than that of their
rivals. The paper also examined the two vital factors of centralized authority and
delegated government, which worked in concert to allow for relative coherence and
efficiency throughout the Spanish lands without the need for direct, centralized
administrative control. Employing the American colonies as a case study, this essay
explored the use of viceroys, audiencias, councils, and other executive institutions. The
vast bulk of the most comprehensive and detailed literature (both primary and
secondary) on the topic of this work relates to the reigns of the Catholic monarchs,
Charles V and Philip II. Therefore, this essay has emphasized the situation during the
reigns of these two monarchs. Nevertheless, a complete study of the subtle variations of
policy between these and the succeeding monarchs is beyond the scope of this paper. It
does, however, contribute a general overview of the subject at hand. In this way, the
Spanish kings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could overcome, or
accommodate, to some degree, the issue of communications in their empire.
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